SECOND
DIVISION
JINALINAN
TECHNICAL G.R. No. 163167
SCHOOL,
INC.
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
(Fourth Division), Promulgated:
JOB
G. OLARTE and DELILAH
T.
OLARTE,
Respondents. August
9, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This
case involves a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It seeks to reverse the
decision of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP
No. 74421 which upheld the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in private respondents’ favor.
The facts are
as found by the Court of Appeals.
Private
respondents Job Olarte and Delilah Olarte rendered various services for petitioner Jinalinan Technical School, Inc. from 1988 to 1994.[1]
For school year 1988-1989, Mr. Olarte concurrently taught
Bible & Math subjects and was Chairman of the Board and received P600.00
per month.[2]
For school year 1989-1990, Mr. Olarte held the
positions of Bible teacher and Treasurer concomitantly, and was paid P660.00
per month. His wife, Mrs. Delilah Olarte, worked as
Official Solicitor and Kinder Teacher without receiving any salary.[3]
During school year 1990-1991, Mr. Olarte again acted
as Bible teacher and Treasurer, and was paid P720.00 per month, while
Mrs. Olarte received P660.00 per month for
acting as PEHM Teacher and worker for the College Care program.[4]
In school year 1991-1992, Mr. Olarte acted as
Treasurer for P780.00 per month, while Mrs. Olarte
worked as PEHM and Bible teacher for P720.00 per month.[5]
For the 1992-1993 academic year, Mr. Olarte acted as
Treasurer for the 1st semester and Cashier for the 2nd semester
for P1,500.00 per month, while Mrs. Olarte acted as Health Aid Instructress & Secretary of
the Board for P1,500 per month.[6] For
the 1993-1994 academic year, Mr. Olarte worked as
Cashier for P1,770.00 per month, and Mrs. Olarte as Health Aid Instructress and Secretary of the
Board for P1,530.00 per month.[7]
For all the foregoing years, the spouses Olarte
worked from June until the first week of April, Mondays to Fridays, from
In June 1994,
sometime before the opening of classes for academic year 1994-1995, Mrs. Olarte was not given any teaching load or administrative position.[9] She asked Mr. Deventre
Orcajada, Vice-President of the petitioner school’s
Board of Trustees, as to the reasons for her non-appointment.[10]
Thereafter, she received an unsigned letter informing her that the reasons for the
non-appointment were: 1) her failure to enroll her daughter in the petitioner’s
High School; 2) her allegedly spreading rumors that the school was about to
close; and 3) her opposition to the fencing of the school campus.[11] Like Mrs. Olarte,
private respondent Mr. Olarte was not reappointed as Cashier.[12]
He inquired from Mr. Ernest Orcajada, Principal and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the petitioner school, as to the reason
for his non-appointment. He was informed
that the reason was
due to the ongoing dispute between his wife’s father and the petitioner school.[13]
Private respondent
spouses then filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries,
nonpayment of overtime, service incentive leave, 13th month and cost
of living allowance, and attorney’s fees against the petitioner school and Mr.
Ernest Orcajada which were consolidated by the Labor
Arbiter.[14]
Petitioner
school and Mr. Ernest Orcajada moved to dismiss the
complaints for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, which the Labor Arbiter
granted on
After
conducting hearings on the case, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision on
The private
respondents appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC. On P129,412.00 and P108,934.00,
respectively.[19]
Petitioner school’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the NLRC on
On
On
On
We rule for
the private respondents.
The
petitioner contends in its petition that the Court of Appeals should have given
credence to the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter as these were “supported
by substantial evidence.”[27]
In fine, petitioner only argues that the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating
the evidence made by the Labor Arbiter. The petitioner overlooks that the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals dealt with a petition for certiorari that it filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure assailing the public
respondent NLRC’s decision.[28]
It is basic that mere errors of fact or law committed by a lower court are not
correctable via a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari.[29]
For a Rule 65 petition for certiorari
to prosper, the tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
must act without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[30] The phrase “grave abuse of discretion” is
well-defined in our jurisprudence. It exists where an act of a court or
tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[31]
For the reason that the petitioner school failed to allege and prove in the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals that public respondent NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion, we hold that the appellate court correctly dismissed
the petitioner school’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
[1] Rollo, p. 47.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Rollo, p. 48; CA rollo,
p. 54.
[9] CA rollo,
p. 86.
[10] Rollo, p. 48; CA rollo,
p. 86.
[11] Ibid.
[12] CA rollo, p.
81.
[13] Ibid.
[14] CA rollo,
pp. 80-88.
[15] Rollo, pp. 48, 72-74.
[16] Rollo, p. 48
[17] Rollo, pp. 49, 76-81.
[18] Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[19] Rollo, pp. 49, 60-66.
[20] Rollo, pp. 49, 68-69.
[21] CA rollo, p.
2.
[22] CA rollo, p.
14.
[23] Rollo, pp. 46-52.
[24] Rollo, p. 54
[25] Rollo, pp. 11, 84.
[26] Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[27] Rollo, p. 31.
[28] Rollo, p. 46.
[29] Elks Club v. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272, 275 (1948).
[30] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
65, Section 1.
[31] Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA
246, 254.